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Identity Politics in Crimea: Internal Borders in the USSR between the 1950s and the 
1970s 
In July 1976, the Soviet Ukrainian government assigned a recent graduate of the Kherson 
agricultural institute to his first job posting in Crimea. Keen to encourage the young engineer 
to stay on the peninsula, representatives of the local authorities met him as soon as he arrived 
in Simferopol. Although they first emphasised that educated specialists were badly needed in 
Crimea, local leaders suddenly claimed that all vacancies had been filled as it came to light that 
R.M. Kerimov was a Crimean Tatar. Kerimov refused to leave Crimea and travelled some 
thirty miles west to the coastal town of Saki. He arranged a meeting at the town council and 
got a job straight away because a young woman assigned to work in Saki had recently refused 
to move to Crimea from her native region in western Ukraine. Kerimov’s first three weeks in 
Saki went by smoothly, but problems started again when he attempted to register as a 
permanent resident at the local workers’ hostel. ‘Are you a Crimean Tatar?’ – the hostel 
manager was startled upon examining his documents – ‘Leave right now, … they might fire 
me, the man who issues passports has already got in trouble for something like this’. As news 
of Kerimov’s ethnic background spread, his boss begged him to leave and even offered to cover 
the engineer’s moving expenses. When Kerimov refused to resign from his job, he was quickly 
fired and the post he had occupied remained unfilled several months later.1 
Kerimov's story illuminates the dynamics of Soviet identity politics in Crimea after the 
wholesale deportations of Crimean Tatars and other non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minorities 
during the second world war.2 Because the peninsula suffered from labour shortages, technical 
expertise was a marker of high social status. As a specialist in agriculture, Kerimov enjoyed 
access to the district and municipal authorities and had no problem finding a job on the 
peninsula. At the same time, over thirty years after the deportations, and despite Khrushchev’s 
public condemnation of Stalin’s xenophobic policies,3 ethnicity remained a key marker of 
belonging in the imagined Soviet community. Kerimov was not allowed to stay in Crimea 
                                                          
1 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, Moscow (hereafter, RGANI), f.5, op.75, d243, ll. 48-59. 
2 The Soviet authorities deported some 263,000 people from Crimea between 1941 and 1945, including 191,088 
Crimean Tatars and smaller numbers of Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Turks, Italians, and Roma. 
Nearly 5000 members of deportees’ families were also forced to leave Crimea between 1942 and 1952. Most 
deportees ended up in Central Asia, where they lived under a ‘special settlement’ regime administered by the 
NKVD.  Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Vnutrishnikh Spraw Ukrainy, Kyiv [hereafter, HDAMVS], 
f.15, o.1, s.172, ark.158-59 [published in O.G. Bazhan et al (eds), Krym v umovakh suspil-no-politychnykh 
transformatsii (1940-2015): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Kyiv, 2016), 838-40]. 
3 Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive, ‘Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU’. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm (accessed on 29 June 2018). 
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simply because of the ethnic identity written into his internal passport. Kerimov’s experiences 
further illustrate how far xenophobia penetrated local society in Crimea. The authorities in 
Kyiv, Simferopol, and Saki were at first blind to Kerimov’s ethnic identity and seemed not to 
communicate with each other once they discovered that he was a Crimean Tatar. While the 
state struggled to enforce its xenophobic policies, the establishment of a Tatar-free Crimea was 
contingent on the collaboration of local inhabitants. Fearful of repression and keen to preserve 
their social and professional status, Kerimov’s Slavic acquaintances made sure that he left the 
peninsula. 
Kerimov’s story further points to the importance of internal borders between Soviet 
republics. Crimea was firmly integrated into Soviet Ukraine after the transfer from Soviet 
Russian to Soviet Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954. Educated at one of Soviet Ukraine’s 
institutions, Kerimov travelled to Crimea on instructions obtained from the republic’s 
authorities. Kyiv thus drew on the republic’s human capital to address Crimea’s economic 
needs. It is also striking that the vacancy in Saki was supposed to be filled by a woman from 
western Ukraine. Keen to turn Crimea into a Slavic nation space, the authorities considered 
Slavs from the supposedly unstable borderlands annexed during the second world war to be 
more inherently loyal citizens and reliable experts than members of non-titular minorities. 
Based on archival research in Ukraine and Russia, and a rich document collection 
published under the editorship of Oleh Bazhan in 2016,4 this article explains the twentieth-
century roots of Crimea’s modern-day Ukrainian, Russian, and Tatar identities. First of all, it 
argues that Crimea established strong administrative, economic, and human ties to Soviet 
Ukraine between the 1950s and the 1970s. The transfer of Crimea from Russian to Ukrainian 
jurisdiction in 1954 was part of an attempt to re-populate the peninsula with agricultural 
settlers from mainland Ukraine. This move was underpinned by Khrushchev’s reliance on the 
Ukrainian republican-level government to invest in the development of Crimean 
infrastructure, especially in the countryside, as well as the hope that large families and even 
entire villages transplanted to the peninsula from nearby parts of Ukraine would provide for a 
more firmly grounded labour force than a mish-mash of individuals from far-flung parts of 
the USSR. Secondly, the article demonstrates that Communist Party officials never 
                                                          
4 O.G. Bazhan et al (eds), Krym v umovakh suspil-no-politychnykh transformatsii (1940-2015): Zbirnyk 
dokumentiv i materialiv (Kyiv, 2016). When citing from this edited volume, I provide the original archival 
reference along with page numbers in Bazhan’s collection in square brackets. 
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established a Ukrainian cultural identity for Crimea.5 Instead, they promoted a composite 
‘East Slavic’ identity which obscured differences between Russians and Ukrainians, as well 
as between Russia and Ukraine. They thus appealed to local residents’ sense of great power 
pride and drew on ethnocentric historical narratives which portrayed Crimea as an ancient 
Russian and Ukrainian land threatened by foreigners abroad and ethnic minorities at home. 
While both Russian and Ukrainian identities served as markers of loyalty on the peninsula, 
Ukrainianness was defined strictly through the prism of ‘eternal friendship’ with the Russian 
big brother. The rhetoric of ‘East Slavic’ unity is today evoked to justify Russian annexation 
of Crimea. Finally, the article shows that this xenophobic and ethnocentric East Slavic 
narrative reverberated on a popular level. Identifying friends and foes in ethnic terms, citizens 
protected their rights on the peninsula against the perceived threat posed by Crimean Tatars.6 
This fuelled conflict with Crimean Tatars wishing to return to the peninsula after the death of 
Stalin, and continues to relegate Crimean Tatars to the status of second-class citizens today. 
 
I. Post-war demographic crisis 
The transfer of Crimea from Russian to Ukrainian jurisdiction was part of an attempt to 
repopulate and to rebuild the peninsula after wartime destruction. By the late 1950s, although 
the number of Crimean inhabitants had just about exceeded what it had been before the war, 
the rural population was still significantly smaller than in 1939.7 The loss of life during the 
                                                          
5 Ethnicity became an important administrative category at least partly because Soviet leaders sought to eliminate 
national inequalities in the 1920s and the 1930s. Yuri Slezkine, ‘The USSR as communal apartment, or how a 
socialist state promoted ethnic particularism’, Slavic Review 53:2 (1994), 414-52. 
6 Xenophobia shaped social and political dynamics in the USSR more broadly. As fears of foreign intervention 
dominated public rhetoric during the late 1930s, certain ethnic groups were destined for wholesale deportations 
during the 1930s and the 1940s. Meanwhile, although Stalinist terror targeted all Soviet citizens irrespective of 
ethnic background, the authorities looked primarily towards Russians and other East Slavs in their search for 
reliable and deserving citizens. Even when Moscow still condemned Russian dominance in the multi-ethnic 
regions of the USSR as a colonial overhang, local activists sometimes guaranteed Slavs preferential access to 
jobs and welfare – this was evident, for example, on the Turksib railway construction site in Kazakhstan. 
Moscow significantly scaled down affirmative action towards non-Russians and rehabilitated certain aspects of 
Russian history and culture in an attempt to propagate Soviet patriotism after the mid-1930s. For example, 
extending control over newly acquired territories in western Ukraine at the end of World War II, they promoted 
Russians and Ukrainians to positions of responsibility and removed non-East Slavic cultures and people from 
the borderlands. In non-Russian republics such as Azerbaijan, the titular nationality enjoyed privileges, while 
the authorities looked at ethnic minorities with suspicion. See, for example, T. Marin, The Affirmative Action 
Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, 2001); M. Pohl, ‘It cannot be that our 
graves will be here: The survival of Chechen and Ingush deportees in Kazakhstan, 1944-57’, Journal of 
Genocide Research 4:3 (2002), 401-30; M. Payne, ‘The Forge of the Kazakh Proletariat? The Turksib, 
Nativisation, and Industrialisation during Stalin’s first Five Year Plan’ in R. Suny and T. Martin (eds), A State of 
Nations: Empire and Nation Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford, 2001), 223-52; S. Frunchak, 
‘Commemorating the Future in Postwar Chernivtsi’, East European Politics and Societies 24:3 (2010), 435-63. 
7 Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Ob’’ednan’ Ukrainy, Kyiv (hereafter, TsDAHO), f.1, op.6, 
s.3001, ark. 118-20 [Bazhan, Krym, 575-77]; Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia 
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Second World War and outmigration to cities resulted in labour shortages across the Soviet 
countryside.8 The problem was further exacerbated as Soviet leaders sought to increase 
agricultural production by expanding sown areas.9 Along with the Virgin Lands and parts of 
north Caucasus, the shortage of agricultural labour was especially burning in Crimea because 
the peninsula had lost a quarter of its population during the ethnic deportations of the 1940s.10 
Although the resettlement of peasants from overpopulated to underpopulated parts of the 
USSR generally fell within the remit of the central resettlement commission in Moscow,11 the 
Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv played a leading role in solving Crimea’s demographic crisis. 
This is because Ukraine had a comparatively large excess of agricultural labour, its 
inhabitants volunteered to move to Crimea and, in contrast to their Russian counterparts, 
republican-level authorities in Ukraine were willing to fund the development of rural 
infrastructure. 
Crimea established strong demographic ties to Ukraine during the 1950s. The majority of 
families arriving in Crimea in 1950 and 1951 hailed from the RSFSR, but Ukraine’s central 
regions turned into the most important source of new labour for the peninsula in 1952, when 
the local authorities welcomed 1576 families from Ukraine and 1311 families from Russia. 
Crimea relied on Ukraine’s labour reserves even more after the transfer from Russian to 
Ukrainian jurisdiction. In the first nine months of 1954, the Crimean authorities registered 
392 new families from Russia and 905 new families from Ukraine. Between 1955 and 1959, 
17,000 families from Ukraine settled in Crimea, half of them from the Ukrainian-speaking 
western parts of the republic.12 Although Russians still outnumbered Ukrainians on the 
peninsula, and new arrivals from Ukraine no doubt included people identified as Russian in 
                                                          
Ukrainy, Kyiv (hereafter, TsDAVO), f.582, op.20, s.93, ark. 305-20 [Bazhan, Krym, 585-617]; TsDAVO, f.2, 
op.13, s.865, ark.49-51 [Bazhan, Krym, 693]. 
8 O.M. Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe krestianstvo ot Stalina k Khrushchevu: seredina 40kh – nachalo 60kh godov 
(Moscow, 1992), 59-60, 80-83, 85, 92; A. Berg, ‘Reform in the time of Stalin: Nikita Khrushchev and the fate 
of the Russian peasantry’ (Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012), 129. 
9 At the same time, various adminitrative measures were taken to improve the performance of the agricultural 
sector. See Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe krestianstvo, 18-36; Michaela Pohl, ‘The Virgin Lands Between Memory 
and Forgetting: People and Transformation in the Soviet Union, 1954-60’ (Doctoral dissertation, Indiana 
University, 1999), 117-18. 
10 Resettlement began very soon after the Crimean Tatars were expelled. Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe krestianstvo, 
90. 
11 Pohl, ‘The Virgin Lands’, 171-72. 
12 TsDAVO, f.4626, op.1, s.273, ark.93-95 [Bazhan, Krym, 384-7]; TsDAHO, f.1, op.6, s.3001, ark.118-120 
(published in Bazhan, Krym, 575-7). 
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their internal passports, the number of Ukrainians in Crimea increased at a considerably faster 
rate than the number of Russians during the 1950s.13 
Crimea's growing dependence on Ukraine's labour resulted from Nikita Khrushchev's 
attempts to reform Soviet agriculture. In contrast to the Russian republic, where Khrushchev's 
plans to amalgamate collective farms into larger agricultural settlements all but ground to a 
halt, the authorities liquidated a much greater number of small and supposedly unviable 
villages in central parts of Ukraine and, especially, in the western borderlands.14 They thus 
uprooted peasant communities and effectively freed up agricultural labour. Between 1950 and 
1953, most of the collective farmers who successfully settled in Crimea came to the peninsula 
with their entire agricultural brigades or collective farms which were dissolved elsewhere, 
especially in the regions of Sumy and Chernivtsi. Meanwhile, settlers who moved to Crimea 
as individual family units were far less likely to stay long-term.15   
As Khrushchev favoured positive incentives over coercion to increase labour efficiency in 
the countryside,16 the authorities in Kyiv emphasised that Ukraine provided the most reliable 
source of collective farmers who would volunteer to resettle in Crimea. Before the death of 
Stalin, Kyiv had sent peasants from overpopulated parts of the republic to such far-flung 
provinces of the USSR as Karelia, Sakhalin, and Khabarovsk.17 Although party agitators 
were not always successful in encouraging Ukraine’s peasants to voluntarily move to 
Crimea,18 the republic’s leadership nevertheless emphasised that Ukraine’s peasants were 
more willing to move to nearby Crimea as compared to other parts of the USSR. They thus 
called on Moscow to revise previous resettlement plans for 1954 which called for thousands 
of Ukraine’s farmers to move to Chita and, as it came to light that RSFSR authorities 
                                                          
13 Before the Second World War and the expulsion of Crimean Tatars, Soviet citizens identified as ‘Russian’ in 
their internal passports had constituted 49% of Soviet citizens in Crimea; Ukrainians made up less than 14% of 
the local population. In absolute numbers, more ethnic Russians than Ukrainians arrived on the peninsula during 
the 1940s and the 1950s. By 1959, citizens identified as ‘Russian’ and ‘Ukrainian’ made up 71% and 22% of 
Crimean population respectively, and most settlements on the peninsula had a clear Russian majority. Still, 
Ukraine was key to Crimea’s demographic growth. Between 1939 and 1959, the number of Ukrainians in 
Crimea increased by 74% from 153,500 to 267,700, while the number of Russians grew by 54% from 557,500 
to 858,300. TsDAHO, f.1, op.6, s.3001, ark.118-120 [published in Bazhan, Krym, 575-7]; f.582, op.20, s.93, 
ark. 305-20 [Bazhan, Krym, 585-617]; TsDAVO, f.2, op.13, s.865, ark.49-51 [Bazhan, Krym, 693]. 
14 Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe krestianstvo, 96-97, 159; Berg, ‘Reform’, 3-4, 39. 
15 TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.8862, ark.139-40 [Bazhan, Krym, 154-55] 
16 This entailed lowering taxes, raising procurement prices, and increasing the presence of communist party 
activists in the countryside. Pohl, ‘Virgin Lands’, 116. For the most part, these tactics did not work. Reducing 
the number of collective farms through the 1950s without actually amalgamating peasant settlements meant that 
the political and social life of collective farms increasingly concentrated in the farm centre, with outlying 
villages belonging to the same collective farm sidelined. Berg, ‘Reform’, 186. 
17 TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.8862, ark. 139-40 [Bazhan, Krym, pp. 150-51] 
18 TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.1483, ark. 6-7 [Bazhan, Krym, 103] 
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struggled to mobilise Russia’s peasants for resettlement in Crimea, to replace Russian with 
Ukrainian settlers.19  
Ukraine's role in Crimea was primarily economic. For old residents, the legitimacy of 
Ukrainian administration was grounded in the promises to fix local agriculture. Immediately 
after the transfer from Russia to Ukraine, local inhabitants attended special agitation meetings 
where some participants publicly expressed the expectation that Ukraine would improve 
agricultural supplies.20 For new settlers, the establishment of Soviet Ukrainian administration 
in Crimea promised improved welfare. Through the 1950s and the early 1960s, the authorities 
relied on local community leaders to encourage Ukraine’s rural inhabitants to move to the 
peninsula. These opinion leaders travelled to Crimea and then organised special agitation 
meetings back at their collective farms or wrote letters to friends and relatives back home in 
which they praised the supposedly high quality of life in their new villages. As late as 1965, 
for example, a Crimean farmer originally from the western Ukrainian region of Volhynia 
portrayed the peninsula as a land of welfare and educational opportunities:  
I moved to Crimea with my wife and two children in 1960… They gave us a 
house, helped us obtain a cow and assigned us work which is in line with our 
professional preparation… We earn good money… We bought a television 
set. We have a garden in which we grow our own fruit and grapes. Our 
daughter Svetlana studies at the Yalta agricultural school, and our son works 
on developing rice paddies. My fellow Volhynians, I pass the sunny greetings 
from all the resettlers at our state farm [sovkhoz]. Join us, you will not regret 
it!.21 
Regional identities and community bonds from mainland Ukraine were thus mobilised 
to encourage collective farmers to dream of a better Soviet future in Crimea.  
Collective farmers who took seriously Soviet promises of welfare in Crimea relied 
heavily on republican-level authorities in Kyiv. After decision making on collective farm 
investment was devolved to the republic level in 1946, Kyiv invested in developing new, 
larger collective farms, while the Russian authorities, largely under the influence of 
Khrushchev’s chief rival Malenkov, resisted attempts to increase state funding for 
                                                          
19 TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.10935, ark. 10-20 [Bazhan, Krym, Part II, Documents 40 and 42] 
20 TsDAHO, f.1, op.46, s.6910, ark.3-5 [Bazhan, Krym, 173-4] 
21 TsDAVO, f.4626, op.3, s.262, ark.3-26 [Bazhan, Krym, Part II, Document 167].  
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infrastructure in the countryside.22 Unsurprisingly, therefore, Crimean agriculture saw little 
improvement in the years before the transfer from Russia to Ukraine. According to the 
authorities in Kyiv, few houses were built in rural Crimea before 1954, and new arrivals often 
found themselves homeless. To remedy the situation, the Kyiv Central Committee drew up 
ambitious plans to build new houses at collective farms between 1954 and 1958, to offer 
loans that would allow collective farms to refurbish existing infrastructure, and to extend tax 
waivers for new agricultural settlers in Crimea from two to four years. 23 Kyiv would likewise 
be responsible for organising and partly funding the building of new schools and 
kindergartens, predominantly in rural parts of Crimea.24 Apart from these improvements to 
the quality of life in the countryside, Kyiv was also responsible for raising agricultural output. 
In the mid-1950s, republican-level authorities saw orchards, vineyards, and tobacco 
plantations as the most important part of the local economy, predicting that new irrigation 
systems would make it possible to increase orchards alone from 17.1 thousand hectares in 
1954 to 30.6 thousand hectares in 1958, but also bemoaning the fact that the actual area of 
orchards under cultivation was twelve percent lower than before the Second World War.25 
Accordingly, the Ukrainian republican institutions would plan and build a new canal to 
expand irrigated areas in northern steppe regions of Crimea.26 
Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv were also charged with rebuilding urban Crimea. Despite 
widespread wartime destruction, no new hospitals were constructed after 1945; the number of 
schools in 1954 was still lower than in 1940; and inefficient water supply and sewage 
systems meant that excrement lined Crimean beaches.27 The Ukrainian government planned 
large investment projects.28 Developing Crimean towns required further resettlement from 
mainland Ukraine and other parts of the USSR. As vacation travel grew, the population of 
Crimean coastal resort towns of Yalta, Alushta, Alupka, and Simeiz would have to rise from 
46,000 to 68,000 in the second half of the 1950s.29 Some urban development projects 
required substantial financial commitments from the Ukrainian republican budget. For 
example, Kyiv would cover over sixty per cent of the costs of building new hospitals and 
                                                          
22 Berg, ‘Reform’, 58-9, 94-6, 114-15. 
23 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark.5-29; TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.10935, ark.10-20 [Bazhan, Krym, Part II, 
Document 42] 
24 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark.5-29. 
25 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark.5-29. 
26 TsDAHO, f.1, op.6, s.2051, ark.7-8 [Bazhan, Krym, 176-8]. 
27 TsDAHO, f.1, op.30, s.3590, ark.93-104, 120-36; TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark. 1-3, 4-29, 31-32, 231-32; 
TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3895, ark.177-80. 
28 TsDAHO, f.1, op.6, s.2110, ark.121-5. 
29 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.4078, ark. 269-270. 
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other medical infrastructure.30 In other cases, such as the rebuilding of the town of Sevastopol 
between 1955 and 1958, most of the funds would come from the central Soviet budget.31 Yet 
money was not the greatest challenge in rebuilding Crimea. Financial resources devoted to 
reconstruction projects on the peninsula went unused from year to year because the 
authorities failed to secure both the building materials and the workforce necessary to 
actually spend them. It would now fall on Ukrainian ministries and republican-level 
enterprises to organise construction work and to provide engineers and other professionals to 
ensure the development of housing, sanatoria, and cultural institutions to serve both locals 
and tourists.32  
II. Ukraine's crisis of legitimacy 
As Crimea underwent large-scale demographic and administrative changes, the 
authorities Kyiv faced a crisis of legitimacy. In the 1950s and the 1960s, they sought to 
legitimise their power on the peninsula by mobilising a sense of great power pride and 
xenophobic sentiment which united old Slavic residents and new settlers in Crimea. 
Promoting a composite 'East Slavic' identity for Crimea in education, in the press, and in 
various public venues such as museums, the authorities obliterated memories of Tatar past 
and downplayed linguistic and cultural differences among Russians and Ukrainians. Soviet-
made identities which emerged in Ukrainian Crimea during the second half of the twentieth 
century were founded on the notion that the Russian-dominated Slavic community was 
constantly under threat from external enemies and ethnic minorities at home. 
Old residents of Crimea were not enthusiastic about the transfer from Russian to 
Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954. At public meetings, they expressed concerns over how the 
move would affect local salaries and supplies.33 Meanwhile, new settlers' hopes for a better 
future in Ukraine set them up for bitter disappointments. Well into the 1960s, Kyiv bemoaned 
the fact that many settlers only stayed in Crimea for several months because collective farms 
were still desperately short of housing, while new buildings were of poor quality (some did 
not have toilets, forcing new settlers to use the facilities at their neighbours' homes). There 
were visible rifts between old residents and new settlers on the peninsula. In the assessment 
                                                          
30 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark.5-29. 
31 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3668, ark. 26, 30. 
32 TsDAHO, f.1, op.6, s.2110, ark121-5; TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3672, ark5-29; TsDAHO, op.1, op.24, s.4078, 
ark.267-8. 
33 TsDAHO, f.1, op.46, s.6910, ark.3-5; TsDAHO, op.1, op.46, s.6910, ark.3-5 [Bazhan, Krym, 173-4] 
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of the republican-level authorities, problems with housing continued because local leaders in 
Simferopol were indifferent or even hostile to settlers. Regional authorities sent settler 
families with children to collective farms with no schools. For their part, collective farm 
chairmen assigned new houses to old residents of Crimea and refused to share basic 
equipment or supplies with newcomers, even in cases where they were in plentiful supply.34  
For Kyiv, increasing Ukrainian institutions' influence over Crimea was tantamount to 
overcoming local resistance to overlapping demographic and administrative change. As 
Crimea was transferred from Russian to Ukrainian jurisdiction, the limits of administrative 
reform were unclear and local officials were not even certain whether Crimea would remain a 
separate oblast.35 In the mid-1950s, local cadres feared that they would be replaced by new 
appointees from Ukraine. The influx of new settlers made personnel changes in Crimea all 
the more likely. Kyiv hoped that Ukraine would provide a source of new, better-educated 
party workers for the peninsula, at least some of whom would be able to communicate with 
new settlers not only in Russian, but also in Ukrainian and Belarusian.36 To be sure, these 
fears were not unique to Crimea, as uncertainty about the future penetrated communist party 
cells throughout the USSR after the death of Stalin in 1953. Rank and file Party members 
across the country were encouraged to engage in discussion at primary party cell meetings 
and to criticise abuses at the local level.37 While these attempts to breathe a new life into the 
Communist Party were directed from Moscow, for Crimean party apparatchiks the instability 
of the mid-1950s was closely associated with the transfer of power from Moscow to Kyiv. 
The Communist Party of Ukraine did Khrushchev’s dirty work on the peninsula as they 
singled out local party bureaucrats deemed particularly unresponsive to the needs and voices 
of ordinary communists and, most importantly, collective farmers.38 There were few 
competent communists who worked in the Crimean countryside, claimed senior Party 
apparatchiks in Kyiv, and local leaders could not even collect basic statistical information 
about rural parts of the peninsula.39  
                                                          
34 TsDAVO, f.2, op.8, s.10944, ark.61-70 [Bazhan, Krym, 231-5]; TsDAVO, f.4626, op.3, s.262, ark.3-26 
[Bazhan, Krym, Part II, Document 167]; TsDAVO, f.2, op.9. s.2589, ark.159-62 [Bazhan, Krym, 617-19]. 
35 TsDAHO, f.1, op.46, s.46, ark.3-5; TsDAHO, f.1, op.30, s.3889, ark.17-18. 
36 TsDAHO, f.1, op.30, s.3590, ark.120-36.  
37 For example, see P. Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-
Stalinisation,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinisation: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev 
Era, ed. Polly Jones (London, 2006), 42-51. 
38 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.3538, ark.14-19. 
39 TsDAHO, f.1, op.30, s.3590, ark.82-90. 
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During the 1950s, Kyiv saw the promotion of Ukrainian language and culture as a means 
to win over Crimean inhabitants to the new Ukrainian administration. Apart from symbolic 
gestures such as the renaming of local sanatoria in honour of Ukrainian literary and historical 
heroes,40 the CPU Central Committee sought to incorporate local inhabitants in Soviet 
Ukraine’s cultural and educational institutions. They focused in particular on the 
intelligentsia. Kyiv thus promised that the publishing house Radyans’kyi Pysmennyk would 
publish Ukrainian translations of books by Crimean writers.41 Although the vast majority of 
Crimean schools continued to teach all subjects in Russian, several hours of Ukrainian 
language instruction were gradually introduced in most schools during the second half of the 
1950s. The Central Committee in Kyiv emphasised that this would allow Crimean school 
graduates to study at Ukraine’s universities.42 On another level, republican-level authorities 
made very cautious attempts to cultivate a distinct Soviet Ukrainian identity among recent 
arrivals to Crimea. Kyiv suggested that Ukrainian translations of Russian-language 
newspapers be published, albeit only in parts of the peninsula with compact Ukrainian 
communities.43 Under pressure from the republican authorities, regional leaders in 
Simferopol also vowed to open schools where Ukrainian would be the main language of 
instruction. They were supposed to serve the nearly 10,000 children of Ukrainian settlers who 
had arrived in Crimea in the early to mid-1950s, most of whom had studied in Ukrainian 
before resettlement.44  
State-sponsored Ukrainian culture in Crimea was inevitably refracted through the prism 
of ‘eternal friendship’ with Russia. The transfer of the peninsula from Russia to Ukraine was 
itself part of broader public celebrations of the 300th anniversary of Russo-Ukrainian union at 
Pereiaslav, which Crimean residents marked in various public forums including open-air 
concerts, special agitation meetings, and exhibitions.45 At school, Ukraine’s Ministry of 
Education expected instructors of Ukrainian language to highlight ties between ‘progressive’ 
Russian and Ukrainian writers before and after the revolution of 1917, as well as to promote 
the idea that Russians and Ukrainians built socialism together in the face of external threats: 
in oral classes, for example, students were supposed to learn such phrases as ‘our friendship 
is stronger than steel’, ‘extraordinary congress of the Communist Party’, and ‘the cruel 
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invader will perish’.46 At the same time, despite efforts made in Kyiv, clear hierarchies 
emerged between Russian and Ukrainian culture in Crimea. For instance, Kyiv insisted that a 
Ukrainian drama theatre be opened in the industrial town of Kerch to showcase how 
Ukrainian playwrights tackled contemporary social problems, thereby proving that Ukrainian 
culture was not confined to folk dance and music.  However, under pressure from the 
Crimean obkom, the repertoire of the Ukrainian theatre which was eventually established in 
Crimea consisted of musicals, probably because the genre was easier to understand for the 
predominantly Russophone local audiences. 47 Crimean authorities thus effectively relegated 
Ukrainian-language theatre to the sphere of entertainment.  
Even cautious attempts to promote Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea proved 
controversial. Old inhabitants of Crimea saw the promotion of Ukrainian-language culture to 
benefit new arrivals. For instance, plans to establish a Ukrainian theatre on the peninsula 
raised alarm among local Russian-speaking actors who feared that they would now be forced 
to move elsewhere. In 1954, Mykola Pidhornyi (Nikolai Podgornyi) had to reassure party 
activists concerned about the Ukrainianisation of public life. In a speech delivered at the 
regional communist party conference, he emphasised that Kyiv had no track record of forcing 
the republic’s residents to use Ukrainian language in public.48 
Attempts to promote Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea lost impetus by the end of 
the 1950s. In particular, the teaching of and in Ukrainian was no longer a priority. Despite 
ambitious plans to open schools with Ukrainian language of instruction,  there were only 
three such institutions in Crimea in the 1959/60 school year, catering for less than half of one 
percent of local children. 49 Moreover, although Ukrainian language was supposed to be 
taught in all Russian-medium schools from grade two upwards, classes were only offered for 
certain year groups. Some schools (including all schools in Sevastopol, which mostly catered 
to the children of military personnel from across the USSR) offered no Ukrainian classes at 
all. No doubt, the limited spread of Ukrainian in Crimean schools was partly due to major 
staff shortages. In September 1954, Kyiv estimated that only 94 out of 2193 teachers in 
Crimea spoke Ukrainian, most of whom had no experience of actually teaching the 
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language.50 More importantly, political pressures from Moscow curbed Kyiv’s enthusiasm. 
Starting in April 1959, in line with all-Soviet education reforms, Crimean parents could 
choose for their children in schools with Russian language of instruction not to study 
Ukrainian (meanwhile, all children in Ukrainian-medium schools took Russian classes). 
Some jumped at the opportunity, concerned that Ukrainian instruction took time away from 
what they deemed more important and practical subjects, as well as by the poor marks which 
Ukrainian language teachers reportedly gave out left and right.51 Moreover, as Khrushchev’s 
reforms undermined the status of non-Russian languages in education and pushed teachers to 
focus more on the development of practical skills and less on the preparation of students for 
further study, the point that proficiency in Ukrainian would enable local children to study at 
Ukraine’s universities became almost moot.52 Although only 117 parents decided to withdraw 
their children from Ukrainian language classes by the end of 1959, proponents of teaching 
Ukrainian in Crimea were on the defensive.53 The CPSU Central Committee sent Kyiv 
unambiguous signals in the autumn of 1959, responding to complaints from a group of 
parents in Simferopol who claimed that one school director ignored their requests to switch 
the curriculum from the Ukrainian to the RSFSR programme and refused to replace 
Ukrainian language classes with other subjects. The authorities considered the case serious 
enough for heads to roll both at the school in question and in Crimea’s regional 
administration. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education received a stern reminder that they must 
now develop a new curriculum for students who opted out of studying Ukrainian language in 
the republic.54 Ultimately, the CPU Central Committee decided to approve special 
educational plans for Crimea, different from other parts of Ukraine, raising the number 
Russian at the expense of Ukrainian classes.55  
While attempts to promote a distinct Ukrainian identity in Crimea proved controversial, 
the republican leadership found common ground with central Soviet decision makers and 
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regional authorities by employing the rhetoric of great power pride in Crimean public culture. 
Drawing on anti-Western sentiments, they encouraged residents of Crimea to celebrate the 
peninsula's role in Russian imperial history. The Ukrainian republican and the all-Soviet 
ministries of culture even suggested he Nazi occupation of Crimea was part of age-old 
conflicts between Russia and the West: they thus agreed to sponsor a movie celebrating the 
heroism of soldiers who defended the peninsula during both the Crimean War in the 1850s 
and the Second World War.56 Unlike the cautious attempts at linguistic and cultural 
Ukrainianisation, the Crimean regional leadership felt at ease with the celebration of Russian 
and Soviet imperial history, lobbying Kyiv (with only partial success) to devote more money 
to anniversary celebrations and a new museum devoted to the defence of Sevastopol in the 
1855.57 Such state-centric narratives helped legitimise Ukrainian administration in Crimea 
insofar as they downplayed distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians and, by extension, 
between old Slavic residents of the peninsula and new settlers. 
Blurring the lines between Tsarist and Soviet history, the authorities portrayed Crimea not 
as a Soviet socialist land under attack by ideological enemies, but rather as an ancient Slavic 
soil under threat from foreigners abroad and ethnic minorities at home. In 1954, a special 
exhibit devoted to the incorporation of Crimea in Ukraine celebrated Russians and Ukrainians 
fighting against Turks and Tatars.58 Even the Crimean Tatar khans' palace in Bakhchisarai 
was meant to become a Slavic landmark. Before the expulsion of Crimean Tatars, the palace 
had contained an exhibit about the Crimean Khanate, but it stood empty during the 1950s. 
Officials at the propaganda department of the CPU Central Committee were nevertheless 
concerned that the tens of thousands of tourists who braved the uncomfortable road from 
Crimea's south coast to Bakhchisarai every year were overly impressed with the 'power of the 
khans' exemplified by the building. They therefore suggested that a new exhibit showcasing 
restoration works at the palace conducted by 'Russian masters' in the nineteenth century be 
prepared. Warning that the museum should not focus on the art and architecture of Soviet 
period which 'would look primitive compared to the old palace', Central Committee officials 
in Kyiv stressed that the exhibit would showcase the close economic and cultural links 
between Crimea and Ukraine, as well as between Ukrainians and Russians. At heart, this was 
an unabashedly xenophobic narrative which portrayed entire ethnic groups in black-and-
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white terms. The Crimean Tatar palace was now supposed to expose the 'parasitic nature of 
the so-called Crimean state, which existed thanks to bandit raids on Russian and Ukrainian 
lands', as well as 'the heroic struggle of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples against the Tatar-
Turkish occupiers'.59  
Soviet identity politics in Crimea was xenophobic not only because it vilified old Turkic 
inhabitants who had been subjected to wholesale deportations, but also because it 
‘discursively cleansed’ Tatars from the local public sphere.60 The Crimean regional 
leadership put pressure on Moscow and, after 1954, on Kyiv to change place names ‘in light 
of the changed composition of the population after the Second World War’ (this odd phrasing 
suggests that the history of Tatars and their deportations was sometimes even cleansed from 
internal party documents).  Although farms and train stations had changed from Turkic to 
Slavic-sounding names in 1948 and 1952, local leaders complained that rivers, mountains, 
and lakes still carried the 'old, Tatar names, which are not understandable for most of the 
population of Crimea'. Their recommendations were not always taken into account, yet it is 
striking that the authorities tried very hard to forget the Tatar past in Crimea, just as their 
counterparts in western Ukraine obliterated memories of a multifaceted German, Hungarian, 
Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian histories of the borderlands.61  
III. Interethnic confrontations 
How to deal with Crimean Tatars was not just a historical question. Although the 
deportees from Crimea were not allowed to return even as they were freed from 'special 
settlement' in Central Asia in 1955 and 1956, other ethnic groups such as the Chechens and 
the Ingush moved back to their homelands during the second half of the 1950s,62 and de-
Stalinisation held out the promise that the tide would turn for the Crimean Tatars, too.63 In 
September 1967, in response to mounting from Crimean Tatar activists, the authorities 
allowed very small groups of Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. This modest concession, 
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combined with the continuing promotion of an East Slavic identity in Crimea, intensified 
interethnic tensions. 
Regional apparatchiks in Crimea and the republican authorities in Kyiv pursued an 
overtly xenophobic policy during the 1950s. In 1954, some 2,500 deportees from Crimea 
were released from special settlement (they belonged to ethnic minorities other than the 
Crimean Tatars). While the deportees sought to convince the local authorities that they could 
mobilise all members of their ethnic communities to return to Crimea and thus help resolve 
the problem of agricultural labour shortages, the head of Crimean executive council M. 
Kuzmenko raised alarm among the republican-level leadership. As a few dozen Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Armenians and Germans returned to Crimea in the first five months of 1954, 
Kuzmenko made no secret that the Party and state authorities primarily concerned themselves 
with satisfying the interests of Slavs:  
Taking into account that Crimea is a borderland zone and a region inhabited 
by recently resettled populations, and that the arrival of deportees with their 
pretensions for homes and property causes unease among the population and 
discourages them from staying in Crimea, we suggest that you prevent the 
deportees from arriving.  
Clearly prejudiced against the deportees, Kuzmenko highlighted the case of a drunken Greek 
man who tried to force people out from his house in the village of Zavodskoe. 64 Kyiv 
listened to the warning signals from Simferopol, with Alexei Kyrychenko informing 
Khrushchev that deportees' demands for housing put off Slavic residents of the peninsula.65  
Groups of Crimean Tatars began to arrive in Crimea in 1957 and 1958. Officials at the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine were alarmed by their interventions in 
local identity politics. Mykola Pidhornyi underlined that a ' significant number' of Crimean 
Tatar intelligentsia used trips to Crimea to collect archival materials and other historical 
evidence to prove that Crimea was a Tatar land and thus to justify their demands for return – 
an obstacle, in his view, to the 'cultural and economic development' of Crimea by Slavic 
settlers.66 Through the 1960s, Crimean Tatar visitors to the peninsula confronted communist 
party authorities about public portrayals of local history. In July 1967, for example, Crimean 
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Tatar tourists took part in an excursion from Yalta to Sevastopol, during which the guide 
described Crimean Tatars as traitors during the Second World War. A group of seventeen 
outraged Tatars (most of whom refused to introduce themselves) visited the authorities in 
Yalta to stress that Crimean Tatars had recently been fully rehabilitated by the Politburo of 
the Communist Party in Moscow.67  
These localised confrontations were enmeshed in a broader conflict between Crimean 
Tatars and the Soviet authorities. Activists who lobbied for the right to return to Crimea 
created the earliest and most organised independent social movement in post-Stalinist USSR. 
During the late 1950s and the early 1960s, they evoked promises of ethnic equality and 
hovered on the margins of what the authorities considered 'legal'. In 1956, widely publicised 
calls for citizens to resettle in Crimea, though targeted at ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, 
sparked off a letter writing campaign among Crimean Tatar war veterans and party members 
who underlined their loyalty to the Soviet state and the Communist Party, stressing in 
particular that they had the necessary expertise in agriculture. The limited cultural openings 
of Khrushchev's Thaw convinced some Crimean Tatar activists that they could now overturn 
Stalinist-era portrayals of all Crimean Tatars as 'traitors' during the Second World War. 'Why 
should the Ukrainian people oppose the return to Crimea of its indigenous inhabitants?', 
asked the authors of one letter, clearly aware that ethnicity was a marker of loyalty in the 
Soviet community. 'The Tatars liberated the Ukrainians from German occupation'.68 Activists 
also travelled to Moscow to lobby top Party leaders and, to the alarm of the KGB, collected 
signatures under petitions to restore the Crimean ASSR among the deportees in Central 
Asia.69 Just as the Tatar past was often cleansed from the public sphere in Crimea, these 
complaints were swept under the carpet among the senior leadership in Moscow. In internal 
correspondence within the CPSU Central Committee, apparatchiks reassured each other that 
most Crimean Tatars were perfectly happy in Uzbekistan, and only the most obstinate 
members of the intelligentsia and former party apparatchiks, who had lost the most after the 
abolition of the Crimean autonomy, insisted on returning.70 Crimean Tatar ideas reverberated 
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among some members of the Ukrainian and Russian intelligentsia.71  By the second half of 
the 1960s and the 1970s, Crimean Tatar activists crossed over into the sphere of dissent. 
Illegal publications such as Khronika Tekushchikh Sobyti publicised their plight and appealed 
to communist parties abroad to exert pressure on the Kremlin. Crimean Tatars maintained 
contacts with dissidents in Ukraine, including Leonid Pliushch, and passed documents 
concerning their activities to the West with the help of Andrei Sakharov.72 
 
In response to mounting Crimean Tatar pressures, the KGB lifted the wholesale ban on 
Crimean Tatar return to Crimea on 5 September 1967. The head of the Ukrainian KGB 
Nikitchenko insisted that this would help take the wind out of the sails of the Crimean Tatar 
movement for the right to return.73 In his view, the change was little more than a symbolic 
gesture: to stop a massive influx of Crimean Tatars, Nikitchenko still suggested that the 
authorities quickly fill vacancies on the peninsula with ethnic Ukrainians from the western 
borderlands.74 Five years later, arguing that legal channels to return should remain open, he 
emphasised that Crimean Tatars would not move en masse because they found it difficult to 
sell their houses in Uzbekistan or to make ends meet in Crimea.75 Lifting the ban on return 
did not mean that Crimean Tatars could move freely – they still needed to obtain an official 
permit and local propiska (registration). While the Uzbek party authorities selected families 
for resettlement, apparatchiks in Crimea did not always approve their candidates, as they 
were only interested in agricultural labourers. The Crimean regional authorities further sought 
to limit the impact of Crimean Tatar settlement by insisting that new arrivals be spread across 
the peninsula in Slavic-majority collective farms.76 Ultimately, opening opportunities for 
legal return to Crimea had little impact.77 Between September 1967 and July 1972, 3177 
Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea through the legal channels.78  
Raising hopes for return, the law of September 1967 heightened tensions on the 
peninsula. The experience of applying for legal return turned some Crimean Tatars against 
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the authorities. When a Crimean Tatar hairdresser was told that he and his wife would not be 
allowed to return because they were not collective farmers, he reportedly told a group of 
officials in Uzbekistan: 
You will not impose your jobs on us. Our people will live and work where 
they want… When our people return to Crimea, you Russians and Ukrainians 
will have nothing to do there, we will take your place, you will only serve 
us… And if you don't do that, we will chase you out of Crimea, just like you 
chased us out.79  
The limited reach of the law evoked anger among Crimean Tatars. Already in the autumn of 
1967, the KGB reported the views of Crimean Tatar activists who saw the law as a token 
gesture intended to destroy the movement for the right to return. Suleiman Asanov, Bekir 
Umerov, Timur Dakchzhi and others travelled in the region to gather evidence that the 
authorities continued to prevent Crimean Tatars from settling on the peninsula: they planned 
to present this evidence during street protests in Yalta, where they hoped to attract the 
attention of international tourists and, through them, the international press.80 Some Crimean 
Tatars whose opinions were registered by the KGB suggested that the official rhetoric of 
ethnic equality was used to mask the reality of everyday xenophobia. L.A. Zatulaev who 
visited Simferopol in October 1967 reportedly claimed that  'if you find a house to buy, they 
do not refuse to register you, but they will pressure the current owner until he says he has 
changed his mind and refuse to sell'.81 In a similar vein, a prominent Crimean Tatar activist 
Iu. B. Osmanov criticised the law which which overtly lifted the ban on return for ignoring 
the national dimension of Soviet discriminatory policies. Crimean Tatars were ostensibly 
given all the rights of Soviet citizens, he underlined, but dispersed returnees to Crimea would 
not be able to access schooling in their own language or to cultivate community bonds unless 
the Crimean Tatar autonomy were restored.  In his view, the new law was merely a means to 
cover up the anti-Leninist policy towards the Crimean Tatars which relegated them to the 
status of second-class citizens during the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
October Revolution.82  
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In the aftermath of 1967, the KGB struggled to control Crimean Tatar behaviour. 
Activists for the right to return staged public meetings for young Crimean Tatars in Crimea 
and neighbouring Ukrainian regions where they discussed news obtained from foreign radio 
stations and taught the history of the Crimean Tatar khanate. They also organised celebrations 
of Muslim holidays such as Kurban Ait, during which they addressed dozens of Crimean 
Tatars settling in Soviet Ukraine.83 Moreover, mass visits by Crimean Tatars to local 
communist party authorities became more frequent in the first few months after the wholesale 
ban on return was lifted in September 1967. Although the KGB was aware that activists 
headed by Bekir Aliev travelled across Crimea to organise a mass visit of Crimean Tatars to 
the authorities in Simferopol, for example, they did not manage to prevent two hundred 
people from filling out the corridors of the local communist party committee on 12 October 
1967. Ten people were taken in for questioning, six were arrested, active participants were 
given official warnings by the KGB, and the rest were dispersed by the militia.84 Similarly, as 
Crimean Tatars planned to mark the 24th anniversary of the deportations in May 1968 by 
putting up tents in central Simferopol, the KGB prevented 800 people from entering Crimea. 
Nevertheless, 300 Crimean Tatars managed to enter the peninsula and began to gather in 
Simferopol on 17 May.  Almost a hundred people were deported, with the most active 
participants put on an airplane straight to Tashkent.85 Faced with these challenges, the 
authorities resorted to the tried-and-tested xenophobic propaganda. The KGB emphasised 
that a show trial of Crimean Tatar wartime collaborators staged in 1972 helped undermine 
Crimean Tatars activities on the peninsula.86 
Illegal Crimean Tatar settlement in Crimea and the neighbouring Ukrainian regions of 
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provided a consistent challenge for the KGB between the 1960s 
and the 1980s. The law of September 1967 encouraged a growing number of Crimean Tatars 
to visit the peninsula and to settle there without official permission. Within days of the ban on 
return being lifted, groups of Tatars came to inspect their former properties.87 Among the few 
Crimean Tatars who arrived on the peninsula through the official channels, many claimed 
that they would now offer housing to their friends and relatives who did not yet have 
permission to return.88 Thousands of Crimean Tatars wishing to settle on the peninsula 
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bypassed officials channels by buying homes from local Slavs at two or three times the 
market price – the sellers would normally leave Crimea after the purchase was complete, 
making it difficult to nullify the transaction, though Crimean Tatars still faced more obstacles 
in legalising such unofficial purchases post factum as compared to other ethnic groups.89 
Between 1968 and 1974, 2493 Crimean Tatars settled in Crimea through the legal channels, 
but the authorities were aware of a further 1196 individuals who arrived without official 
permission (samovol'no).90 The KGB discovered more cases of what it considered illegal 
settlement in Crimea after the mid-1970s.91 At the end of 1985, they were aware of 2973 
Crimean Tatars who arrived in Crimea and the neighbouring Ukrainian regions of 
Zaporizhzhia and Kherson through the official channels, and 4691 who came without 
permission.92 Although the authorities used fines and criminal cases to punish both illegal 
settlers and Soviet citizens who sold houses to them,93 they claimed to only have expelled 
316 Crimean Tatar settlers from Crimea between 1967 and 1985 (a further 365 families left 
of their own volition, most of whom had come through the official channels).94 The KGB's 
relatively lenient attitude towards individuals who violated the rules of settlement in Crimea 
stemmed from the belief that overly harsh measures would provide ammunition to Crimean 
Tatar dissidents.95  
The arrival of Crimean Tatars sparked interethnic tensions on the peninsula. Even before 
1967, visiting the villages from which they had been expelled, Crimean Tatars attracted the 
attention of the KGB as they informed local Slavs about the movement for the right to return. 
Property rights were at the root of rising conflicts. In 1965, for example, three Crimean Tatars 
reportedly moved in to a house occupied by a local Slavic woman, simply announcing that 
'this is our house and we will live here now'. Cultural rights also featured prominently in 
conflicts as reported by the KGB. For instance, five Crimean Tatars confronted two women 
when they found out that houses had been constructed at the site of former cemeteries:  
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You will not get away with this; we will achieve what we have set out to do. 
We will come back here and deal with you. We will take revenge for your 
having disrespected our ancestors.96  
In their reports to the Communist Party, the KGB focused on particularly hostile 
confrontations, tending to portray the Crimean Tatars as aggressive and violent. It is difficult 
to judge how widespread such instances were or how accurately the KGB conveyed what 
happened, but it is clear that the leadership of Soviet Ukraine saw Crimean Tatar visits to the 
peninsula as a threat to the local Slavs. 
As the authorities allowed small numbers of Crimean Tatars to move back to the 
peninsula in 1967, xenophobic confrontations between Slavic inhabitants and the returnees 
intensified. Activists for the right to return encouraged Crimean Tatar visitors to Crimea to 
speak to local inhabitants.97 Reactions varied: through the autumn of 1967, Soviet citizens of 
Russian and Ukrainian background inundated party and state institutions with letters, 
sometimes lobbying on behalf of Crimean Tatars who were still refused official registration 
on the peninsula, but also expressing fears about their property.98 To preserve their privileges 
on the peninsula, some locals took matters into their own hands. Several days after the ban on 
Crimean Tatar return was officially lifted, for example, a group of men in a village near 
Bakhchisarai apprehended four Crimean Tatars taking pictures of local houses and gave them 
over to the authorities. The KGB also reported on tense conversations during which Crimean 
Tatars reportedly claimed that 'all of this will ours soon' – these confrontations happened in 
small groups and not in public, which suggests that the KGB learned about them from Slavic 
citizens who encountered the Tatars. 99 As thousands of Crimean Tatars settled in Soviet 
Ukraine's southern regions during the 1970s, the KGB reported on tensions associated with 
immigration. Crimean Tatars stood apart from local Slavs as, in the KGB's view, they spoke 
poor Russian and engaged in 'backward' and 'unsanitary' religious practices. Local schools 
were overloaded with Crimean Tatar children who tended to socialise within their ethnic 
community.100 Claiming that Crimean Tatar attempts to settle illegally on the peninsula 
evoked the ‘outrage and resistance’ of the local population, the head of the Ukrainian KGB 
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Nikitchenko added that the authorities only just about managed to prevent 'mass unrest', 
though it is not clear whether he referred to potential interethnic clashes.101 
IV. Conclusion 
Transferring Crimea from Soviet Russian to Soviet Ukrainian jurisdiction, Nikita 
Khrushchev celebrated the 300th anniversary of 'Russo-Ukrainian union' at Pereiaslav. But 
the move was much more than a symbolic gesture or a 'gift' from the Russian to the Ukrainian 
people. The incorporation of Crimea in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic served 
primarily to address the peninsula's burning labour shortages.   
 
Crimea became Ukrainian insofar as it established strong demographic ties to 
mainland Ukraine, with Kyiv resettling inhabitants of the republic's central and western 
regions to the peninsula's collective farms. It was also largely the republican-level leadership 
who invested in Crimean infrastructure, particularly in rural regions. Although the communist 
party leadership in Moscow retained ultimate power, borders between Soviet republics 
strongly affected socio-economic dynamics in the USSR. The Russian occupation of Crimea 
in 2014 severed strong economic and human ties which had bound the peninsula to the 
Ukrainian mainland over the previous sixty years. 
 
At the same time, Crimea never acquired a strong Ukrainian cultural identity. Kyiv made 
only very modest attempts to spread Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea, especially in 
the 1950s, as well as to integrate the local intelligentsia in Ukraine's cultural institutions. 
These moves proved controversial, and clear hierarchies between Russian and Ukrainian 
language and culture were preserved in Crimea. Equally important, Crimean culture after 
1954 was not simply Russian. Through education, in the press, and in various public spaces 
such as museums, the leadership of Soviet Ukraine promoted a composite 'East Slavic' 
identity in Crimea. This East Slavic identity was grounded in a sense of pride in both Tsarist 
Russia's and the USSR's victories over external enemies who threatened Crimea. More 
disturbingly, the authorities promulgated ethnocentric and xenophobic narratives which 
presented Crimea as an ancient Slavic 'soil': its non-Slavic inhabitants, who had made up a 
quarter of the peninsula's population on the eve of World War II, were unambiguously 
                                                          
101 HDASBU, f.16/1, por.5, ark.96-8 [Bazhan, Krym, 830-2] 
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portrayed as outsiders who attacked Russians and Ukrainians. Narratives of 'East Slavdom' 
were simple, legible, and largely uncontroversial among the Russians and Ukrainians of 
Crimea, helping the leaders of Soviet Ukraine to legitimise overlapping attempts at 
demographic and administrative reform led by Kyiv. They reverberated on a popular level. 
Fearful for their properties and armed with the xenophobic stereotypes promoted in Soviet 
public culture, residents of Crimea policed their local communities and denounced members 
of non-Slavic minorities to the authorities. 
 
The Crimean case shows that both Russian and Ukrainian identities were markers of 
loyalty in post-Stalinist USSR. Deciding whom to resettle in Crimea, the authorities made no 
distinction between citizens identified as 'Russian' and 'Ukrainian' in their internal passports. 
The prominence of the East Slavic myth in Soviet public culture goes some way towards 
explaining why the myth of the USSR as a land of the 'friendship of the peoples' lives on 
among Soviet citizens who did not experience ethnic discrimination. It further suggests that 
Russian and Ukrainian identities in modern-day Crimea are not reliable markers of attitude 
towards the Soviet past or the post-Soviet present. The fault lines dividing Crimea today do 
not run along the Russo-Ukrainian ethnic divide, but rather expose conflicting visions of the 
peninsula grounded in Soviet-made ideas which equated East Slavic background with loyalty, 
and visions of a post-Soviet Crimea associated with attempts to overcome the legacies 
xenophobia.   
 
The history of Crimea further suggests that the propaganda rhetoric of 'friendship of the 
peoples' was oppressive insofar as it obscured ethnic tensions and thus made it difficult for 
Crimean Tatars and other non-titular ethnic groups to register their grievances. Crimean Tatar 
problems were sometimes even obscured in internal Party correspondence. Moreover, in 
order to promote the image of Crimea as a Soviet melting pot, the Soviet authorities erased 
Crimean Tatars from public culture and memory. After 1967, Crimean Tatars complained 
that the authorities put multiple obstacles that prevented them from returning, but also 
claimed that the ban on return did not exist.  
 
The key role which xenophobia played in shaping social hierarchies in Crimea has also 
been absent from contemporary political discourses. Just as the Soviet authorities claimed 
that they successfully fostered interethnic friendship, Vladimir Putin justifies the Russian 
occupation of Crimea after 2014 by portraying the USSR as a unitary supranational 
 24 
community. He thus questions the salience of post-Soviet borders, dismisses concerns about 
Russian imperial ambitions in the post-Soviet space, and demonises critics of the Russian 
occupation of Crimea as nationalists desperate to disrupt post-Soviet ethnic harmony. This 
rhetoric helps him disarm and suppress Crimean Tatar political, social, and cultural activities.  
 
